Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

8-30-2013

'Holding Up' and 'Holding Out'
Colleen Chien
Santa Clara University School of Law, colleenchien@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
Colleen Chien, 'Holding Up' and 'Holding Out' (2013),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/798

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Santa Clara University School of Law
Legal Studies Research Papers Series
Working Paper No. 19-13, August 2013

“Holding up” and “Holding Out”
Colleen V. Chien
Associate Professor of Law
Santa Clara University School of Law
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2318648

“Holding up” and “Holding Out”
Colleen Chien1
Abstract
Patent “hold-up” and patent “hold-out” present important, alternative theories for what
ails the patent system. Patent “hold-up” occurs when a patent owner sues a company
when it’s most vulnerable – after it has implemented a technology – and is able wrest a
settlement because it’s too late for the company to change course. Patent “hold-out”
is a term I use to describe the practice of companies routinely ignoring patents and
resisting patent owner demands, because the odds of getting caught are small. Hold-up
has arguably predicted the current patent crises – the smartphone wars, standards
patents, or trolls all involve the ex-ante assertion of technology patents. Hold-up theory
has been embraced by thought leaders and fueled the current drive by Congress and
President Obama to reform the patent system. In this essay, I make the counterintuitive
case that hold-up theory is wrong – or at least incomplete – and further, that what it is
missing is full consideration of the other side – the side of hold-out. When large
companies systematically “hold out” on patentees, they have no choice but to work with
efficient patent enforcers or “trolls.” When small inventors can’t get their due in the
marketplace due to unfair disadvantages, jurors just may give it to them in court. I argue
that considering ‘hold-out” and “hold-up” together provide a more complete picture than
focus on either story alone, and that doing so reveals surprising pathways to a better
patent system – focused on the design, rather than the doctrine of patent law. Instead of
trying to eliminate all technology patents, or to enforce all of them, we should try to price
them appropriately and reduce the distortions they produce. Instead of trying to make
patent law perfect, we should make it cheaper, more streamlined, and more equitable.
To do so, lawmakers should prioritize: 1) getting patentees and targets on the same
page as early as possible, through early dispositive and damages disclosures, 2)
tightening the interfaces between the various patent agencies, and 3) making it cheaper
to resolve low-value disputes, as capped for example by the defendant’s revenue
exposure. Each of these steps would go a long way to curbing both hold-up and holdout.
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Introduction
Imagine you have a clever idea for a product and use it to start the business of
your dreams. You open your doors, work day and night, and turn that idea into a hugely
successful business with employees and customers. But then you get a letter from a
patent “troll.” 2 The troll’s timing is deliberate – now that your product is fully developed
and in the market, it’s too late for you to change it. You have no choice but to pay the
troll or endure a lengthy lawsuit.
This story, adapted from a radio ad campaign profiled by NPR, explains the idea
of patent hold-up – the practice of demanding patent royalties from a company when the
company is most vulnerable – after it has implemented a technology. The resulting
settlement is driven largely by the timing of the demand, rather than its merits. 3 The
patent holder “holds up” the seller, prompting a settlement.
Widely theorized and debated in academic and policy circles, 4 the concept of
patent hold-up has gained recent prominence by predicting the current patent “crisis,”
including the smartphone wars between Apple, Samsung, and others, 5 abuse of
standards essential patents, and the rise of patent “trolls” 6 – all through ex-post
assertions of technology patents. Hold-up has drawn intense attention to the patent
system, and not the good kind. Nobel-prize winner Gary Becker has blamed a “defective
patent system [that] creates opportunities for hold ups and excessive litigation.” 7
Federal Reserve economists Boldrin and Levine have called for the elimination of the
patent system on the basis of “a gigantic hold-up problem.” 8 President Obama has
lamented what he sees as not just patent “hold-up,” but “hold-em-up”: when patent
holders “hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some money out of
them.” 9

2

Laura Sydell, “Taking The Battle Against Patent Trolls To The Public” NPR All Things Considered,
August 30, 2013.
3
See infra Part 2.
4
See infra Part 2.
5
For a description of these wars and an examination of the patents involved in them, see Stuart Graham
& Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Of Smart Phone Wars and Software Patents, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES, vol. 27, no. 1, 67 (Winter 2013).
6
A term that refers to entities that do not make products and are focused on the assertion of patents as
their primary business model. Also more politely described as “patent assertion entities.” See Colleen V.
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Environment and Its Implications, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010).
7
Gary Becker, On Reforming the Patent System, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Jul. 21, 2013),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/on-reforming-the-patent-system-becker.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2013).
8
Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(September 2012) available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf(last visited Aug. 1,
2013).
9
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 2 (2013) (quoting
statements made by President Obama on February 14, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
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But while embraced by policymakers, public thinkers, and academics 10 patent
hold-up theory, I argue in this essay, is wrong, or at least incomplete. Policymakers are
moving to curb litigation abuses: the White House has issued five executive actions and
seven legislative recommendations to curb “frivolous litigation;" 11 the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice are investigating patent trolls, 12 and
abuses involving hold up using standards essential patents; Congress is holding
hearings and introducing bills specifically targeted at these developments. 13 As they do,
I argue, public understanding of the patent enforcement dynamic must be calibrated to
include not only patent hold-up but what I call patent hold-out: the practice of companies
routinely ignoring patents and resisting patent owner demands, because the odds of
getting caught are small.
Patent hold-out is widespread, for both legal and practical reasons. While the
hold-up story is sympathetic to defendants, the hold-out story tells the plaintiffs’ side.
Reconsider the story from before, but now put yourself in the patentee’s shoes, and
imagine that the company selling the product is a large, not small, company. As an
inventor you had the idea first and wanted to start a business on it. You tried, without
luck, to get the product commercialized successfully, though you did get a patent. You
find the technology being deployed by a large company and approach it to sign a
license. The company ignores you and refuses to engage or license the patent, no
matter how strong it is or reasonable your offer. 14 The large company is “holding-out” on
your patent demand.
Considering patent hold-up and patent hold-out narratives together, rather than
either narrative alone, I argue in this essay, provides a more robust account of the
patent enforcement dynamic. It also explains some of the shortcomings of patent holdup theory.
For example, to reduce patent hold-up, advocates have recommended reforming
patent remedies and reducing the number of problematic patents. Over the past years

10

Including myself, as described infra at Part ____.

11

W HITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: W HITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON HIGH-TECH PATENT ISSUES (2013), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-techpatent-issues.
12
They use the more polite term “patent assertion entity.” See Public Workshops: Patent Assertion Entity
Activities, THE U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/ (last visited Aug. 1,
2013), Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Head Seeks End to Misuse of Patents, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/business/ftc-head-seeks-end-to-misuse-of-patents.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2013).
13
See, e.g., Matt Levy, Patent Progress’s Guide to Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (Jul. 22,
2013) http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/07/22/patent-progresss-guide-to-patent-reform-legislation/ (last
visited Aug. 1, 2013) (summary of 6 anti-troll bills introduced in the 113th Congress).
14
Chief Judge Rader: Improving Patent Litigation, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 27, 2011)
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rader-patent-litigation.html (last visited Aug 3, 2013) (describing
the related concept of the patent grasshopper that steals technology and “refuses to pay any license fee
until his legs and claws are held to the proverbial litigation fire.”).
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the Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, 15 and Congress have made it harder to get
injunctions and make unsubstantiated damages claims and easier to invalidate bad
patents.
But instead of getting better, things have gotten worse. The smartphone wars
have broken out, 16 resulting, incredibly, in certain models being banned from the United
States. 17 Damage awards have gotten bigger, not smaller. 18 Perhaps most worryingly,
patent “trolls” have filed an increasing share of patent suits, half or more in 2012. 19
Many of their campaigns are opportunistically brought against small companies20 and
end users who are ill-equipped to play the expensive “sport of kings” of patent
litigation. 21 The costs to companies have been estimated to be in the tens of billions, 22
and companies small and large have reported significant operational impacts in surveys
– delayed hiring or achievement of other milestones, shifting the business strategy,
shutting down a business line or the entire business, and/or lost valuation. 23
15

The court of exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases, though not patent counterclaims. See
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
16
See infra Part 2.
17
Certain smartphone models have been banned as a result of ITC exclusion orders. See, e.g., Certain
Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing
Devices, and Tablet , Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (June 4, 2013), available at http://essentialpatentblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/337-TA-794-Limited-Exclusion-Order.pdf (ordering the exclusion of Apple
tablets (iPads) and smartphones (iPhones) from entry into the United States); Diane Bartz, U.S. ITC
Delays Word on Whether Samsung Infringes Apple's Patents, REUTERS (AUG. 1, 2013)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/01/us-apple-samsung-patent-idUSBRE9701CI20130801 (last
visited Aug. 3, 2013) (describing the models as the iPhone 4, iPhone 3GS, iPad 3G and iPad 2 3G).
18
See PWC, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2013) (“Prior to 2012, only three patent infringement
damages awards eclipsed the $1 billion mark. But last year alone, three cases. . . resulted in awards of
$1 billion or greater.”).
19
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, at 5 (“Last year, PAEs brought over 2,500 lawsuits—62% of all
patent suits.”); See also PWC, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2013) (“[A]s of 2012, [patent assertion
entities] accounted for the majority of patent infringement litigation filed in the United States.”). See also
Robin Feldman, Thomas Ewing, and Sara Jeruss, “The AIA 500 Expanded: Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities,” UC Hastings Research Paper No. 45, 2013,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195 (finding the number to be closer to 60%);
Steve Moore, “Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths – A Fractured Fairytale Part 2,” IPWatchdog, July 30, 2013,
accessed August 29, 2013 http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/30/probing-10-patent-troll-myths-afactured-fairytale-part-2/id=43754/ (finding 45% of cases filed between Sept. 17, 2011 and July 30, 2013
to be by a non-practicing entity).
20

Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 0912, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251.
21
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Ed Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En Masse for
Patent Infringement and What Can Be Done available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318666 (reporting that out of the top 10 PAE
campaigns, all involved allegations against technology end-users or implementers, often to the exclusion
of the manufacturer.)
22
James Bessen and Michael Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, __Cornell Law Rev.
(forthcoming), __ (estimating firms accrued $29B in direct costs in 2011), But see Jay Kesan and David
Schwartz, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL LAW
REVIEW (forthcoming 2014).
23
See Chien, supra note __ at 1 (reporting on small company surveys); Joe Mullin, Survey Says: Patent
Attacks Scare Off Customers, Kill Business, ARS TECHNICA (MAY 4, 2013) available at
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Hold-out theory explains why some of these developments have happened,
despite the enactment of many of the cures that hold-up theory has advocated. That
patentees have been “held-out” on explains why they are increasingly partnering with
patent assertion entities (PAEs) or “trolls. 24 Juror sympathy to patentholders whose
claims are ignored can explain large damages award.
A combined view reveals that the answer is not to submit wholesale to either
account but to recognize the problems with the patent system that give rise to both. The
high costs of litigating patents leads to hold-up, as small companies can’t afford to
defend their use, as well as hold-out, as small inventors can’t afford to bring their suits
and turn instead to trolls.
Embracing hold-up and hold-out narratives together reveals surprising pathways
to a better patent system – focused as much on the procedure, design, and institutional
constraints, as on doctrinal levers to effect change. These include 1) early dispositive
rulings, 2) coordination across courts and agencies, and 3) alternatives to expert-driven
damages determination. Rather than trying to eliminate all component technology
patents, or to enforce all of them, the patent system should focus on reducing the
transactions costs that feed both hold-up and hold-out.
Part I reviews hold-up theory and how it has fared in practice. Part II develops
hold-out theory and explains how it fills in the gaps that hold-up theory has left. Part III
discusses critiques of each view and asks which is more compelling. Part IV discusses
the implications and recommendations that follow from a combined view. Part V
concludes.
PART I: HOLD-UP
What do patent trolls and the smartphone and standards wars have in common?
All have captured national attention, and all have been blamed on patent “hold-up.”
What is hold-up? 25 It is when a “gap between economic commitments and subsequent
commercial negotiations enables one party to capture part of the fruits of another's
investment.” 26 In the patent context, when a patent is asserted after a product is made,
the patentee has the upper hand, not due to the economic value of the technology, but
the high cost of changing the product to avoid the implicated technology.

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/survey-says-patent-attacks-scare-off-customers-kill-business/
(citing Colleen v. Chien, Best Practices in Patent Litigation Survey, slide 11, available at
http://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/20486191 (reporting on large company surveys)).
24
See infra Part 2.
25
Patent holdup is one type of hold-up, explored seminally in Oliver Williamson, The Economic
Institutions Of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 61-63 (1985) (describing how
transacting firms can engage in holdup when investments are made).
26
Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up,
74 Antitrust L.J. 603, 603-604 (2007).
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The Contexts of Patent Hold-Up
Early Examples
Complaints about hold-up type abuse date back to the early days of the patent
system. A case from 1835 involved a patent over using coal in a forge. The patent was
issued without any examination, a byproduct of a registration-based patent system 27
blamed for generating many frivolous or useless patents. 28 As a patent “speculator,” the
patentee did not practice the patent on his own but instead demanded payment from
blacksmiths under the simple logic that: “it will be worthwhile for every blacksmith to
give me a couple of dollars for a right rather than contest it with me.” 29 Around that time,
a petition signed by Pennslyvanians protested the patent system as being "liable to
great abuse, and in itself [being] unjust and oppressive." 30 Their main concern was a
too-readily granted injunction, the fear of which drove defendants to pay for patent rights
rather than "suffer the injury of stopping their means of livelihood." 31
The common behavior complained about was the assertion of patents on a
product after it had already been made, and leveraging the fear of an injunction or
lawsuit, rather than the merits of the technology, to wrest a settlement. In other words,
patent hold-up.
Standards Hold-Up
170 years or so later, thinking about hold-up has been advanced primarily in the
context of standards by prominent law and economics scholars and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). 32 To promote consistency and interoperability across products,
industry participants now agree to promulgate a standardized protocol of deploying a
technology like connecting to the internet. In return, holders of patents needed to
practice the standard protocol agree to make their patents available on free or
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) terms. 33

27

In accordance with the first Patent Act of 1793, patents were granted upon registration, rather than
examination, of the application.
28
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote The Progress Of Useful Arts: American Patent Law And
Administration, 1787-1836, 322-331 (Fred B. Rothman 1998).
29
Id. at 323 (describing the facts of Delano v. Scott, 1 Robb P. C. 700, 7 F. Cas. 378 (E.D. Pa. 1835)).
30
Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 Tech & Culture 932, 940 (1991).
31
Id. at 941.
32
See, e.g. the references cited herein, and infra note ___. For criticisms of hold-up theory, see, e.g. cites
to Brooks, Geradin, Kieff, Spulber, and others infra Part II.
33
See, e.g. ANSI Essential Requirements § 3.1.1, described in Guidelines for Implementation of the ANSI
Patent Policy, available at http://mcsac.fmcsa.dot.gov/Documents/Aug2011/DOCUMENT_5-EOBR_Subcommittee_ANSI_Patent_Policy_from_Kraft_MCSAC_FMCSA.pdf (February 2011); ETSI
Intellectual Property Rights Policy section 6, described in ETSI Rules of Procedure Annex 6, available at
http://www.etsi.org/images/ETSI%20IPR%20Policy%20November%202011.pdf (Nov. 30, 2011). See
also Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole, The Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: An
Empirical Analysis, 38 RAND Journal of Economics 905 (2007).
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A kind of super hold-up occurs when a patent holder manages to get its patent
into the standards protocol without making a licensing commitment, or, despite their
commitment, seeks an injunction. If a patent is truly “essential,” 34 its use cannot be
avoided without sacrificing compliance with the standard. A wireless device that
suddenly can’t connect to the internet isn’t worth much. The particular practice of
patentholders suddenly emerging with their demands, after the standard has been
promulgated, has been called patent ambush. 35 The number of patents implicated by
standards can easily number in the thousands, 36 multiplying the risk.
What’s Wrong with the Patent System, According to Patent Hold-Up Theory
Across these contexts, then, three key ingredients of patent hold-up have
consistently been identified: opportunistic “ex post” assertion, marginal patents, and
remedies that disproportionately award the patentee. Each has been a target of patent
reform efforts.
1. Ex Post Assertions
Whether in the form of patent “ambush,” or patent trolling, the problem with
patent hold-up is the timing of assertions. In most cases it’s much more expensive to
change an existing product than to change a product concept still in the design phase.
The incentive to settle is driven by the desire to avoid these additional costs, rather just
than the inherent value of the technology. Accordingly, patent-holders hat rich
incentives to bring their claims after a product has been developed and successfully
marketed.
2. Bad Patents
According to its detractors, hold-up is also made possible by marginal patents. 37
If a product or standard incorporates thousands of patents, there’s a greater chance the
single asserted patent is old or obvious. Complaints that software patents are “junk” are
rife. Calls for reforming marginal patents range from the polite to the adamant: 1) make
them better, 38 2) invalidate them, 39 3) abolish them, 40 and 4) abolish the patent
system. 41
34

Many are not, [CC to add note]
Thomas A. Hemphill, Technology Standards Development, Patent Ambush, And U.S. Antitrust Policy,
27 Tech. in Society 55, 57 (2005) (quoting R.A. Skitol, What Should We Call The New Antitrust?, San
Francisco Economic Roundtable, available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/10545 (May 2002)).
36
See Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991,
1992 (2007) (“As a striking example, literally thousands of patents have been identified as essential to the
proposed new standards for 3G cellular telephone systems.”)
37
Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup Of Standards (And One Not To), 47 B.C. L.
Rev. 149, 150 (2007).
38
Most often, by increasing examination resources. See, e.g. Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software
Patents, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 325, 353 (describing the extra scrutiny that have been applied to business
method patent applications through the second pair of eyes review).
39
E.g. once they have issued, through various post-grant review options, described infra at note ___
35
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3. Disproportionate Remedies
Another source of hold-up are remedies that are out of proportion with the “crime”
of component infringement. 42 Patents confer the right to exclude, but if a patent covers
only a small part of a big product, should the entire product be enjoined? No, in that
case, 43 or when redesign would be really expensive, say advocates. 44 Outsized
damages – that award a large percentage of revenue based on a small patent – are
also to blame. When multiple royalties are sought, the result can be a total royalty rate
that exceeds the entire revenue associated with the product, a phenomenon known as
royalty stacking. 45
The Uptake of Patent Hold-Up Cautions and Cures
Concerns about patent hold-up have been hugely influential among policy
audiences, including the judiciary. When the Supreme Court decided its landmark eBay
v. MercExchange decision, Justice Kennedy specifically cited in his concurrence
“injunction[s]...employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees,” by firms that
use patents “not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees.” 46 The decision made it harder to get injunctions, reducing the
odds of getting one from about 95% to about 75%, and much less, when requested by a
troll. 47 The Federal Circuit has further limited injunctive relief in component patent
cases 48 through a strand of cases. And the district courts have been reluctant to enjoin
products or award inflated royalties based on the assertion of standards essential
patents. 49
The Federal Circuit, under the leadership of Chief Judge Randall Rader, has also
changed damages laws. It is no longer appropriate for a court to assign a single patent,
which may represent just one of thousands of patents, a quarter of the value of the
product without some scientifically justified basis for doing so. 50 When royalty rates are

40

“Them” meaning software patents; see, e.g., Vivek Wadhwa, Why We Need To Abolish Software
Patents, Tech Crunch (August 7, 2010), online at http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/07/why-we-need-toabolish-software-patents/
41
See, e.g., Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Research Division, online at
42
Lemley, supra note __, at 165-166.
43
See, e.g. Lemley and Shapiro, supra note 12, at 2036
44
Id. at 2037-2039.
45
Id. at 2013-2014.
46 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47
Colleen V. Chien and Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The ITC, And The Public Interest, online at
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/pis2012/files/2012/05/Chien-Lemley-Patent-Holdip-the-ITC-and-the-PublicInterest.pdf, 11-13, fig. 1 (2012).
48
See, e.g. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 12-1507 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 11, 2012) (specifying that
in component cases, patentees must prove that the particular caused the alleged harm, or a so-called
“causal nexus.”).
49
Described, e.g. infra Part II.
50
See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the 25% rule).
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calculated based on looking at the royalty rates in like circumstances, they really must
be like circumstances. 51Awards must be based on reality. 52
Finally, policymakers have taken on the “bad patents” that fuel hold-up,
according to its proponents. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has put greater
scrutiny on patent applications over certain types of inventions at the examination
stage. 53 Congress has made it easier to challenge a patent’s validity once it has issued
from the Patent Office. ’ The America Invents Act, created “inter partes review”, which
“allows patents to be challenged on several grounds of validity, without the deference to
the patent that applies in courts. 54 Business method patents are subject to more
searching review. 55
What’s Happened – Patent Hold-Up Has Apparently Gotten Worse
With all of these developments, patent hold-up should be on the wane. But holdup is arguably worse, not better. Seven years after eBay, an industry has developed
around the types of companies about which Justice Kennedy expressed concern.
Patent “trolls,” according to public perception, wait until the technology has been
developed and commercialized in order to get the greatest royalties based on their
assertions. 56 There are more than 15 publicly traded companies whose business model
is primarily the assertion of patents. 57 As the Office of the President’s 2013 white paper
reported, PAEs have brought an increasing number and share of patent suits, 62% of all
suits in 2012, others have pegged the share of patent monetizer suits at closer to 58% 58
or 45%, 59
51

Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 30 S.
Ct. 3324 (2010) (holding that the plaintiff cannot justify a jury’s lump sum award by providing evidence of
other licenses that do not give lump sums).
52
See Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 33 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding the district
court’s royalty rate “out of line with economic reality”).
53
Through the second pair of eyes review process, described, e.g. in Michael J. Meurer, Patent
Examination Priorities, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 675, 676 (2009).
54
Their history and rationale are summarized in Joe Matal, Legislative History Of The America Invents
Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. Cir. Bar J. 539, 598-605 (2012).
55
Namely financial services data processing patents used in the practice, administration, or management
of a financial product, (see Section 18,
56
Brian J. Love, “An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction
Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 161 (2013):
1309.
57

Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls By The Numbers, Patently-O (March 14, 2013), online at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html.
58
Robin Feldman, Thomas Ewing, and Sara Jeruss, “The AIA 500 Expanded: Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities,” UC Hastings Research Paper No. 45, 2013,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195.
59

Based on an analysis of 425 cases chosen at random filed between Sept. 17, 2011 and July 30, 2013;
Steve Moore, “Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths – A Fractured Fairytale Part 2,” IPWatchdog,July 30, 2013,
last accessed August 29, 2013,
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(Source: Executive Office of the President,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf)
Likewise, despite evolution of the damages caselaw, it is not clear that damages
awards are going down and indeed, juries continue to make record awards. 60Some of
this is due to the time it will take for district courts to operationalize the higher standards
of damages proof recently imposed by the Federal Circuit. But it may also be that, as
described in the next section, policy discussions of “hold-up” and apportionment are
falling on deaf (jury) ears.
Finally, the smartphone wars – between companies like Apple, Samsung, HTC
and many others – have further bloodied the waters. The number of smartphone suits
has quadrupled, to 103 since eBay was decided. 61 Products have been banned as a
result. 62
60

Price Waterhouse Cooper, Patent Litigation Study, available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensicservices/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf, 3 (2013) (reporting on the award of three
$1B+ jury verdicts in 2012, as many as had ever been awarded previously; all were subsequently
reduced).
61
See, e.g., Chris O’Brien, Apple, Samsung To Return To Court In High-Stakes Patent Case, Los
Angeles Times (December 5, 2012), online at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/05/business/la-fismartphone-patent-war-20121206 (describing the quadrupling of smartphone related patents suits from
2006, when eBay was decided to 2011). See also David J. Kappos, Investing In America’s Future
Through Innovation: How The Debate Over The Smart Phone Patent Wars (Re)Raises Issues At The
Foundation Of Long-Term Incentive Systems, 16 Stanford Tech. L. Rev. 485 (2013) (comparing the
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Thus, at bottom, hold-up theory has described and perhaps even predicted an
important set of problems. But it has faltered in providing solutions to them. What is
hold-up theory missing? The paradoxical answer, I believe, is, the other side of the
story –patent hold-out.
PART II: HOLD-OUT
While policymakers and academics have embraced the concept of patent holdup, the patent system is administered by judges and juries. Their litigants tell a different
story:
“I could not commercialize my invention alone, but the financial institutions I
needed to partner with largely ignored me when I approached them with my
invention. They were able to adopt my invention without me, and ignore my
protests, because they knew I lacked the resources to take them to court and
stop them.”63
This familiar story 64 describes what I call patent “hold-out” 65 – the practice of companies
ignoring patents and patent demands because the high costs of enforcing patents
makes prosecution unlikely – or, in other words, because they can get away with it.
Each of these phenomena – the practice of companies ignoring high-tech
patents, the high costs of detection and enforcement, in some cases, relative to the
value of the invention, and the underenforcement of patents – has been observed and
documented, but in isolation. Together, they create a cohesive theory of patent hold-out
that provides an alternative explanation for the dysfunctions of the patent system.
The Contexts of Patent Hold-Out
smartphone wars to other historic patent battles). The number of infographics displaying the complex web
of suits has itself multiplied accordingly, see, e.g. [cc to fill in]
62
See, e.g. 337-TA-710 (banning from the US HTC smartphones) and 337-TA-794 (banning from the US
iPhones); the later ban was subsequently vetoed by the President
(http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/AppleLetter.PDF)
63
Letter from Paul Ryan, Chairman and CEO of Acacia Research Corporation to Federal Trade
Commission Regarding “Evolving IP Marketplace - Comment, Project No. P093900" (May 13, 2009),
available at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/iphearings/540872-00048.pdf.
64
Change financial institution to automobile industry, for example, and you have the plotline for “Flash of
Genius,” the only full-length movie centered around the patent system of which the author is aware. See,
e.g., Christopher Anthony Cotropia,, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of Patent Trolls (July 1,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434921.
65
This term has also been used to refer, in the standards context, to patentees who do not submit their
patents to standards body; see Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process (U.
Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 292, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902646,
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1. Early Examples
While undertheorized, patent hold-out and the challenges associated with
enforcing patents have generated policy concern for decades. When introducing his
agenda for patent reform in the 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson cited the fact that,
“the inventor is often faced with time consuming, costly and unnecessary legal action to
enforce his rights” 66as a key motivation. In 1990, the ABA passed a resolution favoring
the creation of low-cost, small claims patent and copyright enforcement proceedings: 67
This move was motivated by the perception that increases in the cost of litigation
“effectively shut out [claimants] from the federal courts.” 68
2. Reverse Patent Hold-Up
Within the patent standards context, patentholders have also worried about
receiving less than they deserve. While hold-up worries about patentholders wielding
undue leverage, hold-out is concerned with the opposite – that implementers (most
often manufacturers) wield undue leverage, allowing them to use standards-essential
patents and not pay for them. For example the manufacturer may argue that they don’t
need a license because the patent is invalid or non-infringed because it is not truly
essential. 69 Or they may use the technology without paying “under the guise that the
patent owner’s offers to license were not fair or reasonable. The patent owner is
therefore forced to defend its rights through expensive litigation.” 70 Manufacturers who
behave this way are accused of engaging in “reverse hold-up,” a species of patent holdout. 71
3. Juror Sympathy and Patent Hold-Out
Juries are also perceived to be sympathetic towards patentees, and the road
they must take to enforce their patents. Juries are more likely than judges to find for the

66

Letter to Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate and John W. McCormack, Speaker of the
House, from President Lyndon B. Johnson Transmitting a Proposal To Modernize the Patent System
(Feb. 21, 1967) (listing patent quality, the time and expense of getting and enforcing patents, and the
speed of disclosure as priorities), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28655.
67
ABA Res. 401-4, 1990 ABA SEC. PAT TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMM. REP. 194.
68
Id. at 194-95.
69
See Damien Geradin, Reverse Hold-Ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced By Innovators In
Standardized Areas (Nov. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711744 at 2-3.
70
Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing
Devices, and Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, ___ [clean cite]
71
Id.
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patentee, 72 less likely to overturn the patent office’s decision to grant a patent, 73 and
more likely to award greater damages. 74 Among patentee groups, the fewer the
inventors, the more likely a patentee is to win. 75
This apparent pro-plaintiff bias extends to concerns about patent hold-out. In
mock experiments, jurors have been known to “fret that the patentee has had to wait
years to recover its damages, and they often ratchet the damages award upward to
compensate.”76 Mark Lemley has noted that courts do this too, in effect adding
prohibited multipliers or “kickers” to damages awards because of a sense of “perceived
unfairness” in the law’s approach to calculating damages. 77
Despite instructions that tell jurors that they should award damages in order to
compensate, not punish, jurors at times instinctively punish hold-out behavior. In the
words of one mock juror: "[the defendant] had the option to license the patent and didn't,
so now we are in punitive damages... and they have to feel the wrath." 78 Because the
manufacturer “held-out” during the negotiation phase, the patentee was forced to assert
the patent later, and it’s the manufacturer’s bad luck that it made the wrong choice and
implemented the invention anyway.
What’s Wrong with the Patent System According to Patent Hold-Out Theory
The common complaints among these diverse accounts include the high costs of
enforcement, risks that patentees have to endure to enforce their patents, and shirking
72

Kimberly Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 107-08 (2007) (finding jury v. bench trial
patentee success rates of ~65% vs. ~52%, based on an analysis of all federal district court patent trials
between 1990 and 2003); see also PWC, 2010 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: THE CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF
PATENT DAMAGES LAW 15 (2010), __, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensicservices/publications/assets/2010-patent-litigation-study.pdf (finding jury v. bench trial patentee success
rates of ~80% vs. ~53%).
73
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA
Q.J. 185, 212-13 (1998) (finding a jury v. bench patent validity rate of 67.1% vs. 57.3%).
74
While a direct comparison is difficult, due to selection bias and the impact of outlier jury demands,
several reports have documented differences in award amounts. Compare Moore, “[j]udges make
damage awards in excess of $5 million in 17% of the cases, and juries award them in 21%,” and Michael
J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel & Samantha Zyontz, Explaining the ‘Unpredictable: An Empirical Analysis of
U.S. Patent Infringement Awards, 35 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 58, 68 (2013) (finding the amount expected to
be awarded by a jury trial to be 2.8 to 29.9 times that of an award by a judge, with an estimated effect of
9.2 times).
75
Moore, supra note ___ at 107 (based on a regression analysis of ~2000 patent trials litigated between
1990 and 2003).
76
William C. Rooklidge, The Real Problem With Patent Infringement Damages, 91 J. PAT & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 484, 487, 2009.
77
Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits and Reasonable Royalties, 51 W M. & MARY L. REV. 666,
662 (2009).
78
Rooklidge, supra note ___ at ___.
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by infringers. Each of these provides an alternative explanation to patent hold-up
concerning what is wrong with the patent system.
1. Ex Ante Shirking (Not Ex Post Assertions)
The problem with hold-up assertions, according to patent hold-up theory, is that
they take place ex post, after the product has already been commercialized and
irreversible investments made. Indeed, that is the typical “troll” story, of a patentholder
lying in wait, and launching surprise attack when a company tries to implement a patent.
But patent hold-out theory explains the timing of these demands – that patent holders
need to resort to ex post assertions because manufacturers ignore ex ante demands,
and, in many cases don’t take steps to clear products prior to their release even though
they are arguably in the best position to determine whether any patents read on their
plans, since they know what they are or aren’t doing. 79 The “troll” isn’t lying in wait, but
rather languishing, having asked repeatedly for help, and repeatedly been rebuffed.
The phenomenon of companies ignoring high- tech patents is welldocumented. 80 From a potential defendant’s perspective, the concerns are practical –
reading the patents of others can increases the risk of an enhanced damage award. 81
Companies also often counseled not to engage or accept unsolicited offers to license or
buy patents, 82 knowing that engaging with the patent holder can often result in legal or
settlement costs. 83 Since only 1-2% of patents is actually litigated, 84 it’s better to take
your chances.
From the patentee’s perspective, though, when companies resist patent
demands, they shirk their responsibilities. In accordance with one inventor’s account: “I
did not have the means to approach and negotiate with these large companies who
were more sophisticated, had more money, and would simply look to delay everything

79

I am thankful to Michael Risch for making this point to me.

80

See, e.g., FTC, EVOLVING MARKETPLACE (documenting through scores of testimony, that patent
problems in the information technology (IT) sector have often “[led] firms to abandon patent ‘clearance’
efforts.” See also Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 283 (2011); and Mark
Lemley, Ignoring Patents, in THE FUTURE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (2012).
81
Chien, Predicting supra note ___ at ___.
82
Technology Development Companies and Individual Inventors, IPNAV http://www.ipnav.com/clientcategories/inventors/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
83
Colleen V. Chien & Stefani E. Shanberg, 10 Ways Startups Can Deal with Patent Troll Demands,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 7, 2012) http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/07/10-ways-startups-can-deal-with-patenttroll-demands/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
84
Chien, Predicting supra note ___ at ___.
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through drawn out litigations.”85 From this perspective, the relative size of the infringer
as compared to the patentee, not the merits of the claim, dictate the outcome – that
companies, especially big companies, hold-out.
2. Risky (Not Bad) Patents
Hold-out theory also finds fault, not with patents themselves, but with the risks
that are required to enforce them. When a patent is asserted, there’s a risk it will be
challenged and ultimately invalidated. A court can knock out a patent on a variety of
bases– that the invention doesn’t cover protectable subject matter, the patent doesn’t
enable, doesn’t adequately describe, etc. 86 Even if the patent is valid, the patent may
not be infringed – if the terms aren’t interpreted “just so,” the contested behavior won’t
be covered. 87
The patentee can survive the battle and still lose the war. A patentee may spend
millions of dollars enforcing patent only to have it invalidated by the PTO. 88 Large jury
verdicts are often reduced, 89 and what the claim terms mean overturned against
plaintiffs about a third of the time, and even more often with high-technology patents. 90
Even after a license agreement is secured, patents can be challenged over and over
again. 91
It is for all of these reason, some argue, that patentees need big wins, to make
up for the failures. 92 Indeed, patents are perceived as risky assets, 93 heavily discounted
in debt transactions. 94

85

Testimonials, ACACIA RESEARCH GROUP LLC http://acaciatechnologies.com/testimonials.htm (last visited
Aug. 4, 2013).
86
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012),
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/the-fractioning-of-patent-law-0.
87
Through a process called claim construction; see id.
88

Financing Patent Monetization, IPNAV (Nov. 2012) http://www.ipnav.com/resource-center/ideas-andinsights/financing-patent-monetization/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
89
See, e.g., PWC, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2013) (reporting on the reduction of several highdollar jury awards in 2012).
90
Christopher Anthony Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Review Deference or Correction Driven?,
at Table 2 and 3 (May 16, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (reporting that these findings, for the patentee,
are overturned more often than findings for the defendant), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2265962.
91
Risch, patent challenges and royalty inflation
92

I am thankful to Michael Risch for making this point to me.
See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, vol.
19, 67 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567883.

93
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3. Disproportionate Litigation Costs (Not Disproportionate Remedies)
According to patent hold-up theory, what fuels patent abuses are outsized
remedies. But patent hold-out finds fault in the high costs of litigation, relative to the
value of the case – that is, it costs more to bring a suit than the suit is worth. The
problem is, in other words, disproportionate litigation costs, not disproportionate
remedies.
Disproportionate costs are particularly problematic for low-value disputes.
According to the 2011 AIPLA Annual Economic Survey, when less than $1 million is at
risk, it costs $916,000, on average, to litigate it through trial. 95 Litigation becomes even
more unaffordable when both sides’ costs are factored in. This is less likely to be the
case when more than $25 million are at risk, where the average cost of $6 million per
party is a fraction of the reward. 96

94

Joseph W. Jennings, IP Debt – The New Monetisation Option, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MANAGEMENT
(May/June 2014), 41, available at http://www.ipnav.com/linkservid/C341533B-5056-90000331C4401FA78344/showMeta/0/.
95
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I153-I-154 (2011) [hereinafter “AIPLA REPORT”]. The 2011 AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey shows
that the average cost of a patent infringement suit where less than $1 million are at risk is $490,000
through the end of discovery and $916,000 inclusive of all costs. Where $1-$25 million are at risk, the
average patent infringement suit costs $1.633 million through the end of discovery and $2.769 million
inclusive of all costs. Where more than $25 million are at risk, a patent infringement suit costs $3.553
million through the end of discovery and $6.018 million inclusive of all costs.
96

Id. at I-154.
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Per Party Cost in Patent Litigation, as a Share of Value of Case
Based on AIPLA 2011 Annual Economic Survey Figures
Source: Chien & Guo, 2013 97
200%
180%
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

183%

Cost Through
Discovery as
Percentage of
Average Value of
Case

98%

13%

21%

Up to $1M case $1-$25M case

7% 12%

All Costs as
Percentage of
Average Value of
Case

$25M + case

97

Colleen V. Chien & Michael J. Guo, Does the US Patent System Need a Patent Small Claims
Proceeding? (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-13, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249896. Calculations are based on mean costs and
average case values, e.g. $500,000 for the up to $1 million range, $12.5 million for the $1-$25 million
range, and $50 million for the greater than $25 million range. These cost estimates are for one party in a
one-patent lawsuit assuming non-contingent representation.
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PART III: WHO IS RIGHT?
As with most things, the truth between these diametrically opposing views lies
somewhere in between. In this Part, I explore the counterarguments and available
evidence behind each theory to determine which narrative is right. I find that the rapidly
emerging state of patent hold-up – as expressed through the smartphone and standards
wars and the growth of patent trolls – and the impacts on innovation in the form of
disrupted innovation present the most urgent concern. But I find that hold-up theory also
has deficiencies that patent hold-out can address, explaining why hold-up cures haven’t
worked and the dynamics that reforms that need to take into account in order to be
successful.
1. Critiquing Patent Hold-Out
a. Patent Non-Enforcement Is Good for Consumers and Competition
Although the hold-out story is compelling on a personal level, the social calculus
must also include transaction and information costs. According to some, the
underenforcement of patents is actually good thing to a point, because it “shelters”
follow-on innovation from the costs of licensing and risks of liability. 98 Although this view
may seem shortsighted, sustained innovation in information technology, despite the
norm of patent acquisition and non-enforcement, 99 belies such a characterization.
Making the converse point, patent enforcement has been accused of undercutting the
“permissionless innovation,” 100 credited with fueling internet-based economic growth. 101
In addition, the hold-out story assumes that inventors should get the full benefit of
their inventions – a reasonable conclusion to draw from the statutory right to exclude 102
that the statute promises. But such a result could be disastrous socially. Consumers
and other producers should, and also do share in the benefits – according to one
estimate, innovators capture, on average, only 2.2% of the total value of their
98

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 53,
59 (2011) (“The costs of the patent system provide shelter for infringing behavior that might otherwise
lead to either licensing or liability, perhaps mitigating excesses in the patent system while retaining strong
rights that motivated owners may enforce.”).
99
Due in part to patent détente, see Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New
Complex Patent Environment and Its Implications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010).
100
Brad Burnham, Software Patents are the Problem Not the Answer, UNION SQUARE VENTURES (Feb. 19,
2010) http://www.usv.com/2010/02/software-patents-are-the-problem-not-the-answer.php (last visited
Aug. 4, 2013).
101
Vinton Cerf, Keep the Internet Open, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2012)
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/opinion/keep-the-internet-open.html (discussing “permissionless
innovation”) (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
102
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2013).
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innovations, other producers and consumers enjoy the rest. 103 The focus shouldn’t be
on trying to increase the returns to patentees to 100%, but on optimizing the total social
return.
Still, it’s hard to know where the right balance should be. The hold-out story is
consistent with the theories of thinkers like David Teece that a lack of complimentary
assets makes it harder for innovators to appropriate the value of their technologies, 104
and the Schumpeterian view that perfect competition provides inadequate incentives to
innovate. 105 However, given how incremental advances are in high-tech, it is also
suspected that many patented innovations would have happened anyway, regardless of
the patent.
b. If Patent Hold-Out is the Problem, Patent Assertion Entities Aren’t a Good
Solution
In light of current policy debates, then, the more important question may be, not
should we be worried about hold-out, but, does the current model of patent assertion do
a good job of rewarding and incenting innovation? On this score the available empirical
evidence is not encouraging: the transactions costs associated with PAE assertions
appear, in some cases, to dwarf the return to the inventors. 106 Many PAE assertions
focus on the “wrong” target – small companies 107 and end users108 that appear to have
been named in order to generate nuisance-fee settlements. In the case of user suits,
the party that can most efficiently resolve the dispute, the supplier, has often been left
off. 109 The returns generated from such campaigns, then, don’t reflect the economic
value of the patent, but the avoidance of legal costs – which comprise pure rentseeking.
103

William Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper 10433, 2004), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10433.
104
David J. Teece, Profiting From Technological Innovation: Implications For Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL. 285, 288-90 (1986).
105
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950).
106
See, e.g., James E. Bessen, Michael J. Meurer & Jennifer Laurissa Ford, The Private and Social
Costs of Patent Trolls (Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-45,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1930272 (estimating that only
26% of licensing revenues, on average, go to inventors); and Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion Entities,
Presentation to the Dec 10, 2012 DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs, 56 (citing an RPX survey covering 900
litigation, in the majority of them legal costs exceeded settlement costs). But see Colleen V. Chien,
Startups and Patent Assertion, New America Foundation 2013 (forthcoming). Documenting a wide variety
of deal points among innovators and the PAEs that monetize their patents (lump sum or “ranging from
10% to 67%, sometimes in combination with an upfront payment.)
107
A high percentage of unique defendants to PAE cases make $10M or less. See, e.g., Chien, Startups
supra note ___, accord Bessen & Meurer, supra note ____ at ___.
108
Chien & Reines, supra note ___ at ___.
109
Chien & Reines, supra note ___ at ___.
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In addition, the economics of patent assertion create their own distortions. The
economies of scale that make patent assertion worthwhile require patent assertion
entities to be very selective, choosing carefully a few patents to assert over and over. 110
This approach, while practical, necessarily shuts out many patents and patentees. That
might be a good thing, filtering out many low-value patents, but it doesn’t provide a
complete solution to hold-out– as PAEs can’t vindicate the rights of every deserving
patentholder. In addition, the patents that are the most valuable from an assertion
perspective – old, broadly worded, detectably infringed, and understandable by a jury aren’t necessarily the ones that have contributed the most to the field.
For patent assertion to better address the problem of patent hold-out, then, it
should cost less, return more to inventors, focus on the right targets, and reward true
technical contribution – for example where there is actual theft, high patent quality, or
industry recognition – rather than patent contribution.
2. Critiquing Patent Hold-Up
a. Not All Hold-Up is Created Equal
Nor does hold-up theory get everything right. By casting the mere legal act of
patent enforcement in pejorative terms, “hold-up” causes suppliers to dig in, refuse to
pay, and spend money resisting meritorious assertions. To the extent that hold up
theory encourages a misimpression that all patents are bad it feeds the inefficiencies
that flow from company refusals to pay.
In addition, critics have said that hold-up doesn’t really exist because the
reputational costs and repeat player nature of interactions between patentees and
infringers encourage patentees to “play nice.” 111 They prefer private ordering
arrangements, for example standards rules and patent pools, 112 to government
solutions.

110

Colleen V. Chien, Turn the Table on Patent Trolls, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2011) (describing the PAE
business model as one that is based on economies of scale and relies on using the same patents, in the
same venues, using the same contingent fee lawyers) (last accessed Aug. 4, 2013); accord Risch, supra
note ___ Patent Troll Myths.
111
Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up
Replacing Private Coordination, J. COMP. L. & ECON., 8(1), 10.
112
Id.; see also Robert Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Exchange: The Case of Patent Pools,
in INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTS: NOVEL CLAIMS TO PROTECTION AND THEIR BOUNDARIES (Oxford Univ. Press,
2001) (Rochelle Dreyfuss, ed.).
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These criticisms have their greatest force when applied to conflicts between
repeat players who have symmetric stakes and participate in private ordering activities,
for example standards-setting. 113 Indeed, those who have looked for evidence that holdup has actually occurred in this context have found a lack of empirical evidence. 114
But these reassurances are much less persuasive when applied to certain types
of patent “trolls.” An entity formed solely to assert a single patent portfolio 115 is by
definition not a repeat player, 116 and does not have a market reputation to defend. It
can’t sign licensing commitments in exchange for being part of a standard when it only
acquires the patents long after the standard has been formed. The measurable harm to
innovation – in the form of delayed hiring, business pivots, and the killing of products
and product lines – has also been documented. 117
History also belies the assertion that private ordering can provide a complete
solution to patent trolling – during the two historical eras of trolling most similar to the
present, Congressional, PTO, and court leadership were key to restoring patent
equilibrium. 118
In addition, the enforcement “norm” typically associated with “trolls” is
increasingly being engaged in by operating companies. There has been a proliferation
of litigation involving standards-essential patents, 119 and filing of SEP cases at the
ITC, 120 an act seen as largely inconsistent with the commitments to license. This
development has proven so troubling that the DOJ, FTC, and President have weighed
in to stop it. 121 Based on a survey I did among over 100 companies, 44% said that they
had monetized or were thinking about monetizing their patents. 122

113

Roger G. Brooks, Patent ‘Hold-Up,’ Standards-Setting Organizations And The FTC’s Campaign
Against Innovators, 39 AIPLA Q. J. 435, __ (2011).
114
Id. (citing comments from standards setting bodies, companies, and one professor to support its
position).
115
Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012), available at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf (describing the practice of PAE Intellectual
Ventures setting up a shell company for each patent acquisition).
116
Though if owned by a larger well-known patent assertion entity it may be.
117

See Chien, supra note ___ (describing small and large company surveys by Chien).
Chien, Reforming supra note ___; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND
U.S. INNOVATION, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
119
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b. The Hold-Up Cure of Fixing Remedies Has Not Yet Solved The Problem; HoldOut Explains Why
Finally, hold-out theory exposes the weaknesses of hold-up “cures,” and why
despite apparent progress, fights involving patent hold-ups have become more, not less
frequent . Hold-up theory has largely been concerned with large defendants and the use
of high switching costs to gain leverage. The focus on remedies follows from this
concern. However, hold-up theory has, in doing so, ignored small defendants, and the
reality that for them, it is the cost of defense, 123 not the ultimate remedy, that creates
undue leverage. If it costs close to a million dollars to defend a case, 124 even if there is
no threat of injunction or damages about a certain amount, it will always cheaper to
settle.
The appeal of hold-out to judges and jurors also explains why courts may resist
the changes to damages methodologies motivated by hold-up concerns. Jurors'
“willingness to disregard the boundaries of law and evidence” 125 to arrive also the
outcome they believe to be fair, suggest that changing the law alone will not be the
answer to reducing hold-up. The answer is, in part, to better educate jurors on the role
of the patent system within the broader social context and about the impacts of litigation
and remedies on defendants, in particular small defendants, as well as to better police
the evidence jurors are allowed to see. Injunctions liability for component inventions
should be clarified and communicated, so that courts have appropriate guidance when
given the “nuclear option” of an injunction.
PART IV: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Combining ‘hold-out” and “hold-up” perspectives reveals surprising pathways to a
better patent system – focused on the design, rather than the doctrine of patent law.
Rather than trying to eliminate all technology patents, or to enforce all of them, we
should enable challenges to their validity to happen early and inexpensively and price
them appropriately and more importantly, in a way that laypeople can determine, in
proportion to their value. Instead of trying to get patent law perfect, we should make it
cheaper, more streamlined, and more equitable.
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This part considers four of the more promising ways of doing so: 1) reducing
duplication by improving coordination between the venues; getting the patentee and
accused on the same page as early as possible through 2) early adjudication of
dispositive issues, including patent validity and 3) early damages disclosure and nonexpert damages methodologies, 4) promoting proportionality between the economic
value of a patent and the cost of fighting about it, including by penalizing hold-up and
hold-out, through fee-shifting.
Reduce Duplication, Improve Coordination 126
After a patent has issued, its validity can be contested in three different venues –
the PTO, the district court, and the International Trade Commission, also known as the
“unholy trifecta” of patent law. 127 The ITC and district court apply different standards for
making this determination than does the PTO (which has, within the PTO, four different
ways to do so), 128 and all three venues offer different procedures.
A patent can be enforced in both the district court and the ITC, but the remedies
and procedures available to the parties are different. While district court decisions bind
the ITC, the inverse is not true, even though the ITC decides cases much more quickly
than the district court. 129 Within the district court, multiple cases on the same patent can
be filed within different district courts, and often are, for forum shopping and
jurisdictional reasons.
These complexities create incentives for litigants to litigate the same issues in
multiple venues. For example, over 90% of ITC patent cases in 2012 had a district court
counterpart. 130 PAE cases are routinely filed in multiple districts. 131 The different
standards each use invite waste by defendants and plaintiffs, and make it much more
likely that cases will be settled for the cost of defense, rather than based on the merits
of the case.
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One way to decrease the incentives to file in multiple venues is by tightening the
interfaces – by staging the various proceedings so that only one at a time is being heard
and they bind each other – and reducing the differences between them. In exchange for
patent validity challenges at the PTO being brought within a certain period of time after
a case is filed, the district court should stay the case, and the PTO should be able to
hear the same grounds of validity that are available in the district court. Since this could
introduce delays to the plaintiff receiving relief, accelerated review, for a fee paid by the
defendant requesting review, could be required. When the ITC hears a case, it should
apply the same standard as does the district court to the decision of whether or not to
grant an injunction. Expanding the bases for post-grant review and ensuring that PTO
challenges result in a stay, and making these efforts have preclusive effect in the district
court, but still be appealable, and harmonizing injunctions law between the ITC and
district court, 132 would further these aims.
Another source of duplication arises when hundreds of adopters of a technology,
rather than the single supplier of the technology, are pursued for patent infringement.
Though sometimes there are practical reasons for these suits, they are also happening
with increasing frequency because customers are generally unsophisticated and can’t
count on manufacturers to step in and assume the defense. 133 Absent compelling
reasons, the pathways to manufacturers standing behind their products should be
removed. 134
Get the Patentee and Accused On the Same Page As Quickly as Possible About the
Merits of a Case
Holding up and holding out happen because the parties disagree about whether
the target needs a license. Among the various assessments that need to be made in
order for a court to rule on, some are dispositive and do not require intensive fact
discovery. For defendants, these include the availability of defenses like exhaustion and
certain grounds of patent invalidity (like patentable subject matter). For plaintiffs, these
may include the meaning of a particular claim term, or whether the target knew about
the patent. Early determination of these dispositive issues would reduce the risks for
both plaintiffs and defendants.
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Given how diametrically opposed the patent hold-up and hold-out perspectives
are, what they commonly endorse deserves careful attention. In the spring and fall of
2013, I surveyed 500 in-house, plaintiffs, and general attorneys about their perspectives
on various patent reforms. The intervention about which there was the strongest finding
and consensus among the three communities was the value of judges deciding early
summary judgments motions – over 90% of plaintiff’s lawyers, outside counsel, and
defendants and defendant/plaintiff lawyers thought that practice would be very or
somewhat effective at increasing efficiency in patent adjudication, with 76% of inside
counsel in companies, 72% of outside counsel generally, and close to 50% of plaintiff’s
counsel believing the intervention to be “very effective.” 135 In a follow-up discussion of
these results, judges said that they would be more inclined to do so if the parties agreed
to have all of their SJ motions heard at once, rather than bringing them serially. 136
The ITC has taken the lead in early disposition by implementing a pilot program
that provides for an early determination within the first 100 days of a case. 137 The
program has been praised for reducing costs and narrowing the scope of the hearing,
and includes features like staying discovery on all issues other than case-dispositive
issues. 138 The district court should follow suit, through legislative or judicial prioritization
of cases.
Get the Patentee and Accused On the Same Page As Quickly as Possible About the
Value of a Case Through Alternatives to Expert-Driven Damages
Hold up and hold-out also occur because the parties disagree on the value of a
patent and have very different reference frames for calculating this value – parties are
often loath to provide sensitive financial information about sales, profits or past licenses,
for example, until they have to. This disagreement is fueled by non-specialist juries and
a flexible legal standard for calculating damages that enables damages experts to come
to diametrically opposing opinions about the value of a patent, driving even further apart
parties’ expectations. Steps should be taken to reduce the gap in expectations between
the parties and facilitate earlier dispute resolution.
Patentholders and their targets should know ahead of time what the range of a
patent’s worth, instead of relying on courts to make the determination. One way to do so
135
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would be to allow parties to give up damages precision in favor of speed: as one
prominent alternative solutions provider relayed to me lawmakers should “[f]ocus on
speed—business and commerce need certainty and speed—not Georgia Pacific factors
after 36 months.” Mechanisms that arguably rate low on precision but high on speed
and certainty include rate tables139 mediation, 140 or employing a simplistic formula (for
example based on lines of code or total patents on the feature based on a keyword
search) for reducing the information and transactions costs associated with patent
valuation should be explored. To the extent that other “rules of thumb” are used in real
life to determine the value of ex ante licenses, those should be favored. If a patent is
only one of a thousand that a product reads on, and is worth less than a cent per unit at
best, as has been determined in the case of Microsoft Windows’ products practicing
Motorola’s H.264 patents, 141 and the parties both know that ahead of time, perhaps
paying that rate will be a better option than arguing about its enforceability.
Promote Proportionality
Finally, the patent system should provide incentives and ways for cases to be
resolved at a cost that is proportional to their value. First, driving up the costs of the
other side – via holding up or holding-out – would be penalized, for example, by making
two-way fee-shifting the norm and requiring parties to pay beyond core discovery,
To proportionally rightsize patent proceedings, options like excluding
attorneys, 142 tele-conference based trials, eliminating unnecessary discovery and
witnesses, eliminating juries, 143 and capping damages, based on, for example, revenue
or cost of component parts, 144 have been suggested by those on both side of the
139
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issue 145 and could be offered to litigants as options for pursuing low-cost and efficient
relief. The value of the case should be determined based on using defendant’s product
revenue as a cap. Many litigants would likely give up due process for certainty, and low
transaction costs.
PART V: CONCLUSION
There are two sides to every story, and patent enforcement is no exception. But
focusing on the problems that fuel both the over enforcement of patents, or patent holdup, and the under enforcement of patents, or patent hold-out – namely the high costs,
uncertainty, and duplication that reside in the patent system – both problems can be
reduced. Scholars and others have focused for decades on getting patent law right – by
having doctrinal debates and engaging in substantive policy-making. But in the
meantime, they have created a patent law that no longer works for businesses and
others in the innovation ecosystem. The design, as much as the doctrine of patent law,
matters; this essay is meant to stimulate further thinking and dialog about it how to
improve it.
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